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Our understanding of the mechanisms of loss and recovery of consciousness, following severe brain injury or
during anesthesia, is changing rapidly. Recent neuroimaging studies have shown that patients with chronic
disorders of consciousness and subjects undergoing general anesthesia present a complex dysfunctionality in
the architecture of brain connectivity. At present, the global hallmark of impaired consciousness appears to be
amultifaceted dysfunctional connectivity patternwith bothwithin-network loss of connectivity in awidespread
frontoparietal network and between-network hyperconnectivity involving other regions such as the insula and
ventral tegmental area. Despite ongoing efforts, the mechanisms underlying the emergence of consciousness
after severe brain injury are not thoroughly understood. Important questions remain unanswered:What triggers
the connectivity impairment leading to disorders of consciousness? Why do some patients recover from coma,
while others with apparently similar brain injuries do not? Understanding these mechanisms could lead to a
better comprehension of brain function and, hopefully, lead to new therapeutic strategies in this challenging
patient population.
This article is part of a Special Issue entitled Epilepsy and Consciousness.
© 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Consciousness is a multifaceted and ambiguous concept and the
focus of both scientiﬁc and philosophical debate. Despite ongoing
efforts, no universal deﬁnition of the term has been agreed on [1,2].
For practical and didactic purposes, consciousness is often described as
having two main components: awareness and wakefulness [3]. Aware-
ness refers to the phenomenal perception of self and surroundings or, in
the words of Nagel, “the subjective character of experience” [4]. Aware-
ness appears anatomically related to structures in the frontoparietal
cortex [3]. At present, there is no single marker of awareness, but its
presence can be clinically deduced from behavioral signs such as visual
pursuit or responses to command [5]. Wakefulness describes the state
of arousal or the potential to experience awareness. It is supported by
structures in the brainstem and clinically evidenced by the eyes being
open [3]. Wakefulness generally precipitates awareness; an increase
in arousal is usually accompanied by an increase of conscious experi-
ence, leading to a linear correlation of the two components along the
spectrum of consciousness [2]. For example, during deep sleep, coma,
and anesthesia, awareness and wakefulness decline simultaneously
[3]. In some cases, however, the two are dissociated. On the one hand,
during vivid dreams, wakefulness is lowered, whereas internal aware-
ness is preserved. On the other hand, in some pathological states, wake-
fulness is spared, while awareness is impaired [6–8]. These states
comprise the minimally conscious state (MCS) and the vegetative state
(VS, now also called the unresponsive wakefulness syndrome — UWS
[9,10]), as well as absence seizures, complex partial seizures, and som-
nambulism (Fig. 1). Studies of these dissociated states offer a unique
opportunity to disentangle and critically investigate the neural corre-
lates of awareness.
Here, we review the current understanding of (un)consciousness
obtained from studies of disorders of consciousness (DOC) following
brain injury (coma, VS/UWS, and MCS) and general anesthesia. We
focus on functional neuroimaging studies and address the utility of
these techniques in the diagnosis of patients with DOC (for a review
on electroencephalography – EEG – studies, see [11]).
2. Disorders of consciousness and neural correlates of awareness
Disorders of consciousness remain among the most challenging
and poorly understood conditions in modern medical care. Patients
with VS/UWS are seemingly awake but exhibit no behavioral signs of
awareness [3]. Vegetative state/unresponsive wakefulness syndrome
typically follows a coma, a state of complete unconsciousness from
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which the patient cannot be aroused [12,13]. Minimally conscious
state patients show ﬂuctuating awareness and may respond appro-
priately to some stimuli [14]. Minimally conscious state was recently
subcategorized as MCS plus and MCS minus based on the presence
or absence, respectively, of language comprehension [15]. Emergence
from MCS is deﬁned as the return of reliable communication or func-
tional use of objects [14].
Conventional brain structural imaging studies have shown hetero-
geneous lesion patterns in DOC, suggesting that no speciﬁc brain region
can be unequivocally related to awareness [16]. This is supported by
observations in transient unconscious states, such as during epileptic
seizures, where the core pathology is related to the abnormality of
brain function rather than macroscopic structure [17]. Nonetheless,
widespread diffuse axonal injury and thalamic damage have been ob-
served in patients with VS/UWS following traumatic brain injury
[18,19], supporting the role of the thalamus and cerebral cortex in the
genesis of awareness.
Using 18-ﬂuorodesoxyglucose positron emission tomography, a
technique which measures brain energy turnover, we showed that
awareness is not tightly related to the global brain metabolism [20]
but, rather, to the preservation of a large-scale frontoparietal network
encompassing the polymodal associative cortices [21]. In line with their
clinical condition, patients with MCS show a partial preservation of
this large-scale associative frontoparietal network [22]. Similar ﬁndings
of frontoparietal deactivation have been recorded in somnambulism
as well as in absence and complex partial (mainly in the temporal
lobe) seizures [6–8], whereas temporal lobe seizures without loss of
consciousness are not accompanied by these widespread changes [7].
Connectivity within the frontoparietal regions and their tha-
lamic connections appear to play a key role in themaintenance of con-
sciousness. Thus, reestablishment of thalamocortical activity in a
patient with VS/UWS was observed upon recovery [20]. Furthermore,
disconnection between primary sensory areas and higher-order asso-
ciative cortices, which are thought to be required for conscious percep-
tion [3], has been demonstrated in patients with VS/UWS during
passive auditory and noxious stimulations [23,24].
There is now increasing evidence that this large anatomical
frontoparietal cortex contains at least two main functional networks,
clearly linked to spontaneous mentation (Fig. 1) [25]. The external
awareness network, or executive control network, subserved by lateral
frontoparietal regions, shows increasing activity during attention-
demanding cognitive tasks. The internal awareness network, or default
mode network (DMN), is a mesial frontoparietal network that appears
to be involved in self-related processes [26]. Activity in the two net-
works is normally anticorrelated — when one is active, the other is not
[25]. However, studies using functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI) found decreasing anticorrelation in anesthesia [27], deep sleep
[28], and VS/UWS [29], showing the anticorrelation to be a core con-
stituent of conscious cognition [30].
Because of its link to internally oriented cognitive content, such
as mind-wandering and autobiographical memory recall, the DMN, in
particular, has been proposed as the locus of conscious awareness
[25,31,32]. Resting-state fMRI studies have detected reduced connectiv-
ity in the DMN of patients in coma, VS/UWS, and MCS (Fig. 2) [33]. This
decrease of connectivity was correlated to the level of consciousness,
mostly affecting the precuneus, a brain area considered to be a critical
hub within this network with a massive degree of interconnectivity
[34]. Similar decreases in DMN connectivity were observed in healthy
controls during deep sleep [35], sedation, and general anesthesia
(Fig. 2) [27]. Nevertheless, coherentDMN connectivity has also been ob-
served in VS/UWS and anesthetizedmonkeys [29,36]. This suggests that
the DMNmay not be a strict reﬂection of conscious mental activity, and
there are indications that the role of the DMN in consciousness is highly
complex. Concurrent with decreasing DMN connectivity, we recently
reported increased connectivity in the deep structures of the limbic sys-
tem (i.e., the ventral tegmental area, the insula, the orbitofrontal cortex,
and the hypothalamus) in patients with DOC (Fig. 3). The effect was
greater in patients with VS/UWS than in patients with MCS [37]. This
limbic hyperconnectivity may reﬂect the persistent engagement of
residual neural activity in self-reinforcing neural loops which may dis-
rupt normal patterns of connectivity, including synchronized neural ac-
tivity in DMN. A loss of connectivity is, therefore, not necessarily the
global hallmark of impaired consciousness but only an aspect of a mul-
tifaceted dysfunction in the architecture of brain connectivity [37]. Cor-
respondingly, patients with complex partial seizures due to temporal
lobe epilepsy associated with mesial sclerosis show increased regional
synchronization in areas outside the DMN, such as the ipsilateral
parahippocampal gyrus, midbrain, insula, corpus callosum, bilateral
sensorimotor cortex, and frontoparietal subcortical structures [38]. Al-
though these ﬁndings were detected during interictal periods, they
might still support more complex connectivity interplay in the emer-
gence of consciousness.
3. Detection of awareness in disorders of consciousness
Detection of potential awareness in uncommunicative brain-
damaged patients raises important ethical and medical concerns re-
garding end-of-life decisions and palliative treatment [5]. At present,
the gold standard to assess the level of consciousness is behavioral as-
sessment [5]. Lack of behavioral responsiveness does not, however,
imply absence of consciousness. Clinical studies have shown that up
to 40% of patients with a diagnosis of VS/UWS may, in fact, retain
some level of awareness [39–41]. The main causes of misdiagnosis are
associated with patient's disabilities such as paralysis or aphasia, confu-
sion of terminology, and the use of nonstandardizeddiagnosticmethods
[42]. Even with the best clinical assessment, the level of awareness in
patientswithDOC can still be underestimated [43]. Indeed, neuroimaging
Fig. 1. The two main components of consciousness: wakefulness and awareness. Correla-
tion between wakefulness, related to brainstem ascending reticular activating systems
[68], and awareness, related to cortico-thalamic network connectivity. In most physiolog-
ical, pharmacological, and pathological alterations of consciousness, wakefulness and
awareness are positively linearly correlated. In some cases, however, both components
of consciousness are dissociated. Vegetative state/unresponsive wakefulness syndrome,
VS/UWS; minimally conscious state, MCS; emergence of MCS, EMCS.
Adapted from [3].
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studies have detected residual cognition and awareness in somepatients
with VS/UWS. In one exceptional case, it was even possible to establish
two-way communication. The researchers asked the noncommunicative
patient to “imagine playing tennis” to respond “yes” and “imaginewalk-
ing into your house” to respond “no” to biographical questions during an
fMRI scanning session [44].
Unfortunately, fMRI-based communication is impractical. The fact
that a scanner is needed limits its use to a hospital setting and precludes
application in patients withmetal implants or in critical condition in in-
tensive care. Active command paradigms combined with EEG [45–47]
or electromyography [48] are more wieldy solutions, which have al-
ready permitted the detection of voluntary brain function in patients
with VS/UWS and enabled functional communication with patients
with complete locked-in syndrome (i.e., fully conscious but completely
paralyzed including eye movement [49]).
These methods may, in principle, be used as a differential diagnostic
tool, since active compliance by the patient unequivocally proves the
presence of conscious awareness. However, diagnostic paradigms rely-
ing on the patients' active collaboration present signiﬁcant drawbacks.
The risk of false negatives is high, and even patients with MCS often
fail to comply [50]. This may be due to several reasons. For example, a
patient may not have understood the task instructions because of deaf-
ness, aphasia, or ﬂuctuating levels of consciousness [43]. Methods that
can detect consciousness without the collaboration of the patients are
therefore needed. Transcranial magnetic stimulation combined with
EEG (TMS–EEG) is a promising approach. This technique allows nonin-
vasive stimulation of a subset of cortical neurons, measuring the effects
of the perturbation across the cortex [51]. Stimulation of a superﬁcial re-
gion of the cerebral cortex of patients with VS/UWS with TMS has been
shown to either induce no response or trigger a simple, local EEG re-
sponse, indicating a breakdown of effective connectivity [52,53], similar
to that observed in deep sleep and anesthesia [54,55]. In contrast, in pa-
tients withMCS, TMS triggered complex EEG activationswhich sequen-
tially involved distant cortical areas, similar to activations recorded in
locked-in patients, in healthy awake subjects, and during vivid dreams
[53,54,56]. Interestingly, a patient with MCS assessed during a period
of no responsiveness still showed complex and widespread brain re-
sponses to TMS, even though no conscious behavior could be observed
at the bedside [53].
4. Unconsciousness in general anesthesia
General anesthesia is a reversible state of unconsciousness. As the dos-
age can be controlled, it provides a unique opportunity to explore the cor-
relates of (un)consciousness in its different stages. General anesthesia is
inducedbypharmacological drugs that provoke loss of consciousness, im-
mobilization, and analgesia with concomitant stability of the autonomic,
cardiovascular, respiratory, and thermoregulatory systems [57]. Despite
routine clinical use and ongoing investigations of the cellular effects, no
consensushas yet been reachedonhow the anesthetics induce alterations
of consciousness [58]. However, some progress has recently been made
showing hypnotic anesthetic agents that target speciﬁc brain sites, the
function of which is hierarchically altered in a dose-dependent manner
[58]. Unlike sleep, the primummovens which occurs in brainstem struc-
tures [59], the primary site of action for hypnotic agents, is believed to be
at the cortical level,with secondary involvement of the brainstem [57]. In-
hibitory anesthetic agents cause awidespread decrease of resting cerebral
metabolism as well as reduced brain activations in response to external
stimuli (especially in the cortex, thalamus, and midbrain) [60,61].
Being themost extensively studied anesthetic agent, we reviewhere
the research on the effects of propofol (for an extensive review on other
anesthestic agents, see [62,63]). Functional magnetic resonance imag-
ing studies have shown that propofol-induced anesthesia is associated
with decreased corticocortical and thalamocortical connectivity in
higher-order brain networks including frontoparietal networks (i.e., ex-
ecutive control network and DMN) and the salience network [27,64]. In
contrast, functional connectivity in low-level sensory cortices (i.e., audi-
tory and visual networks [27]) appears relatively preserved, in linewith
previous observations in patients with DOC [24]. In addition, both DMN
activity and cross-modal interaction between auditory and visual net-
works could be correlated to the level of consciousness [27]. However,
a recent EEG study found unchanged thalamocortical connectivity
Fig. 2. Default mode network (DMN) connectivity in vegetative state/unresponsive wakefulness syndrome (VS/UWS), minimally conscious state (MCS), healthy controls, and during
general anesthesia using propofol. The DMN spatial map is only partially preserved in VS/UWS, MCS, and during anesthesia. Results from independent component analysis (ICA).
Adapted from [27,37].
Fig. 3. Brain disconnectivity in patients with vegetative state/unresponsive wakefulness
syndrome (VS/UWS). In vegetative state/unresponsive wakefulness syndrome (VS/
UWS), the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) are
hypoconnected to the default mode network (DMN, in blue) and hyperconnected to the
frontoinsular cortex (in red). The hippocampus is hyperconnected to the ventral tegmen-
tal area (VTA) and cerebellum (in red) and hypoconnected to the DMN (in blue). Correla-
tion from random effect (p b 0.01) and clustered-corrected (p b 0.05) results based on
general linear model maps with seed region of interest comparing patients with VS/
UWS to healthy controls.
Adapted from [37].
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during propofol anesthesia, while a decrease of corticocortical connec-
tivity was still observed, especially in backward connections between
the frontal and parietal cortices [65]. These results suggest that propofol
induces a breakdown in brain functional integration, modifying both
within- and between-network connectivity [27,61].
Besides decreasing activity in the higher-order brain areas of the
cortex, increase of connectivity has also been observed in other brain
regions during sedation [66], as already observed in patients with
DOC. Mild sedation with propofol increased thalamic excitability [65]
and increased connectivity between the pontine tegmental area and
the insulae [64]. Speciﬁcally, increased connectivity between the thala-
mus and the auditory, insular, and sensorimotor cortices has also been
reported under propofol-induced anesthesia [64]. Altogether, these
ﬁndings support the hypothesis of a complex brain connectivity archi-
tecture in the emergence of consciousness and demonstrate the impor-
tance of considering functions of a brain region in terms of its functional
integration rather than segregation [67].
5. Conclusions
In the last decade, the progress of neuroimaging techniques has led
to substantial developments in our understanding of consciousness.
Novel applications of functional neuroimaging have provided important
insights into the pathophysiology of DOC and enabled new diagnostic
approaches. Studies in both DOC and anesthesia have shown that
altered states of consciousness are related to a complex dysfunctionality
in the connectivity architecture of the brain. Breakdown of connectivity
within the frontoparietal associative networks and increased connec-
tivity between networks involving subcortical structures appear to be
involved. Nevertheless, all answers lead to new questions, and it is
clear that our current insights are just the tip of the iceberg. A deeper
understanding of the physiology of consciousness may help provide
patients with DOC with better diagnosis and treatment. Hopefully,
this knowledge will ultimately lead to therapy which may be able to
restore consciousness in this challenging patient population.
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